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Abstract
The Basel Process is a key element of the global ¯nancial system
and as such plays an important role in co-ordinating the multilateral
e®orts of various committees, uniquely geared towards fostering and
maintaining ¯nancial stability.
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\The objects of the Bank are: to promote the co-operation of central
banks and to provide additional facilities for international ¯nancial
operations [:::]"
Article 3, BIS Statutes (20 January 1930)
I Introduction
In the almost 75 years since it was ¯rst drafted, Article 3 of the BIS Statutes
has lost none of its relevance for the process of fostering a stable global ¯-
nancial system. Strengthening both monetary and ¯nancial stability is the
traditional remit of central banks and other monetary agencies, but achieving
these twin objectives may not be possible without the close co-operation of
other regulatory and supervisory bodies.
In addition, the various components and players of the global ¯nancial sys-
tem - namely the ¯nancial markets themselves, institutions and the associated
infrastructure - may not all be subject to the same sources of concern and
threats, thus requiring di®erent policy approaches and measures in order to
achieve the stability of the ¯nancial system as a whole. Because the stability
of the ¯nancial system depends so critically on the institutions, structures and
governance arrangements that comprise it, continued policy coordination and
cooperation is paramount. The Basel Process plays a key role in strengthening
the stability and resilience of the global ¯nancial system.
II Promoting monetary and ¯nancial stability
Promoting both monetary and ¯scal stability are key goals for the authorities,
but while there is broad agreement on the de¯nition of the former, this muchII PROMOTING MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 2
less the case for the latter.
A De¯nitions matter
The consensus with regards to the de¯nition of monetary stability has emerged
over the last ten years and permits various notions ranging from stability of
the (anticipated) value of money, to price level stability or even low levels of
in°ation. Indeed, there is also broad agreement that it is a vital ingredient for
sustainable economic grow, has got a unique institutional responsibility (i.e.
the central bank) and that the authorities need to be engaged in continuous
e®orts to achieve it. The story for ¯nancial stability is somewhat di®erent
as there is a much broader spectrum of de¯nitions; consensus only seems to
exist on in as far as ¯nancial stability is deemed a \good thing" and is mostly
noticed when it is absent.1
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between a systems approach { pri-
marily linking ¯nancial stability to a well-functioning ¯nancial system2 { on
the one hand, and a more narrow de¯nition relating the term to the (excess)
volatility of an observable ¯nancial variable such as asset price volatility or in-
terest rate smoothness. The debate around ¯nding a suitable de¯nition is more
than a semantic one, particularly since such a de¯nition then predetermines
the role of monetary policy in contributing to ¯nancial stability.
1One of the earliest de¯nitions of ¯nancial stability is given by Bagehot (1873): \[It is :::]
not a situation when the Bank of England is the only institution in which people have con-
¯dence. More recently, during the 1997 Jackson Hole conference dedicated to \Maintaining
Financial Stability in a Global Economy", Crockett (1997) introduces the distinction be-
tween two types of ¯nancial instability: that of institutions and that of markets.
2Mishkin (1992) o®ers a systems-based de¯nition, describing a stable ¯nancial system
as one which ensures \[...] without major disruptions an e±cient allocation of savings to
investment decisions".II PROMOTING MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 3
B A trade-o® between monetary and ¯nancial stability?
In the sense of Tinbergen (1956), if the CB has only one policy instrument,
namely monetary policy, it can only achieve one independent goal, which is
price stability. By delegating the broader objective of ¯nancial stability to
a ¯nancial regulatory authority, time inconsistency complications of a direct
trade-o® between the two goals can be avoided. In turn, this then raises the
question for policy makers of identifying suitable trade-o®s between monetary
and ¯nancial stability.3
The conventional view is highly skeptical concerning existence of trade-o®,
since monetary instability { i.e in°ation distorting perceptions about future
return possibilities { is regarded as the main threat to ¯nancial stability. Ac-
cording to this view price stability is almost a su±cient condition for ¯nancial
stability. In this sense, central banks should not focus on gauging the e®ects
of asset price in°ation on core in°ation, but should rather place their focus
on capital requirements that increase with growth of credit collateralised by
in°ated assets 4
More recently as in°ation rates have reached historic lows in most indus-
trialised economies, a new school of thought has emerged which suggests that
low and stable in°ation can make ¯nancial system even more vulnerable due to
the threat of asset price bubbles and the associated \irrational exuberance".5
In an attempt to reconcile these con°icting views, Issing (2003) concludes
that the strict systems-based de¯nition of ¯nancial stability excludes any trade-
3If ¯nancial stability is indeed de¯ned as interest rate smoothness, a trade-o® with price
stability immediately follows from Poole's (1970) result, whereby in the face of an aggregate
demand shock the monetary authorities need to choose the degree to which they want to
stabilise interest rates or output and in°ation.
4See also Schwartz (1995; 2002) for one of the most vociferous proponents of this school
of thought.
5Borio et al. (2003) provide an overview of this so-called new environment hypothesis.III THE BASEL PROCESS 4
o® between monetary and ¯nancial stability, by de¯nition. The key to solving
this apparent contradiction lies in shifting the focus on to the policy horizon:
In this context, a short-term con°ict between monetary and ¯nancial stability
may indeed be possible, as long as it is optimal for the authorities to deviate
from desired rate of in°ation to maintain price stability over medium run.
With the clear de¯nition of an appropriate horizon to which policy objective
should apply, the con°ict disappears. In a more radical interpretation of the
issue, Laidler (2004) argues strongly that the authorities should stick to basic
task of targeting in°ation while holding lender of last resort (LORL) powers
in reserve, and not be tempted by any form of trade-o® simply for the sake of
achieving ¯nancial stability.
The institutional responsibilities for ¯nancial stability are traditionally
shared across di®erent institutions, namely ¯nance ministries, the central bank
and regulators. While clearly de¯ned accountability of each of the institutions
involved is a sine-qua-non, the actual goal of ¯nancial stability can only be
bought about by an e®ective coordination of these e®orts. This is the role of
the so-called Basel Process.
III The Basel Process
As a direct result of the globalization of domestic ¯nancial markets, central
banks and regulatory authorities have recognised the growing need for a cen-
tral vehicle for coordinating their e®orts. With their various regulatory and
supervisory initiatives and by providing the institutional building blocks, the
Basel-based committees form the natural home for such a global coordination
exercise. Collectively, this interaction of the committees and their workingIII THE BASEL PROCESS 5
groups is often referred to as the Basel Process. As such, it refers to a global
framework of regulatory and supervisory harmonization of processes and stan-
dards. Despite its global focus, one of the unique features of the process is its
ability to incorporate regional elements without necessitating separate regional
channels for cooperation.6
One of the most prominent components of the Basel Process is the new
capital adequacy framework, commonly referred to as Basel II (2004), which
after almost four years of intense consultation was endorsed by central bank
governors and the heads of bank supervisory authorities of the G10 in June
2004. More generally, the Basel Process serves as the infrastructure to facilitate
the creation of such standards as the twenty-¯ve Core Principles for E®ective
Banking Supervision (1997) or, as mentioned, Basel II.
A Components of the Basel Process
There are four main Basel committees that are at the very centre of the Basel
Process. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), established
by the G10 central banks in 1974, deals with the activities of commercial banks
{ it this committee (including its roughly twenty-¯ve technical working groups)
which is responsible for the new capital adequacy framework.
The Markets Committee7 together with the Committee on the Global Fi-
nancial System (CGFS), established in 1963 and 1971 respectively, broadly
cover issues related to the functioning of foreign exchange and related ¯nan-
cial markets. Whilst both committees focus on recent developments, possible
6For a comprehensive treatment of the various aspects of regional harmonisation, partic-
ularly in Asia, and the Basel Process, see Yoshikuni (2002).
7Unlike the CGFS, the Markets Committee does not have a formal policy mandate from
the G10 governors and mainly serves as a forum for an open and informal exchanges of views
amongst senior o±cials responsible for market operations in the G10 central banks.III THE BASEL PROCESS 6
future trends, and considerations of the short-run implications of particular
current events, discussions in the Markets Committee are informal and not re-
leased to the public whereas those in the CGFS are conducted with a view to
formulate appropriate policy recommendations for central banks. The topics
monitored by the CGFS are also often referred to as `macroprudential issues'.8
The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), established
in 1990, focuses on market infrastructure issues and therefore monitors and
analyses developments in domestic and cross-border payment, settlement and
clearing systems. The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS),
established in 1994, deals with various aspect of insurance companies.
Given the complexity and linkages between the various relevant topics that
form the area of competence of the Basel-based committees, successful inter-
national cooperation is only possible as long as there exists a clear division
of labour between the individual committees and their secretariats. Regular
meetings at either the committee or working group level form the main mecha-
nism that drives the process. However, a common criticism levered at meeting-
based e®orts driven by other international bodies is that such processes are
overly bureaucratic, cumbersome and - not at least because they are heavily
in°uenced by opinions and beliefs of the organizing body - they lack a free
and open exchange of views and discussions. The informal nature of the Basel
Process avoids many of these pitfalls, despite a considerable amount of `behind
the scenes activities'.9 In addition, with many of the key issues pertaining to
the stability of the global ¯nancial system becoming increasingly integrated
8See Borio et al. (2003) for a detailed description of this concept and how it relates to
other aspects of regulatory and supervisory arrangements.
9E.g. the multi-year e®ort in the context of the review of the 1988 Accord on capital
adequacy involved more than 40 working groups, including many ad-hoc and temporary
















Figure 1: The Basel Process
BCBS: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; CGFS: Committee on the Global Finan-
cial System; CPSS: Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems; IAIS: International
Association of Insurance Supervisors; IOSCO: International Organisation of Securities Com-
missions
across markets, participants and borders, coordination of activities amongst
the committees is also of paramount importance. Yoshikuni (2002) summarises
the key function of the Basel Process as one of
\[::: providing] the international ¯nancial community with the op-
portunity to explore good governance in various regulatory and su-
pervisory issues in forums that allow a frank exchange of views with
the support of highly sophisticated analysis." (p.5)
Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the specialised `division of labour' be-
tween the various committees involved in the Basel Process.III THE BASEL PROCESS 8
B Evolution and Increasing Co-operation
The in°uence of market participants has rendered the Basel Process more
transparent and market oriented. The inclusion of a new element into the
process is probably best illustrated in the context of Basel II, particularly, the
decision to allow banks to use their internal models to assess risks. Further-
more, ¯nancial innovations evolving at increasing speed and stronger global
linkages between markets have called for the closer cooperation of the various
Basel-based committees at di®erent levels and intensities.
As the intensive deregulation, liberalisation and globalisation of the 1990s
led to an increasing erosion of the dividing lines between banks, securities
companies and insurance companies, closer cooperation between the regula-
tory and supervisory bodies dealing with the speci¯c segments of the market
became a pressing priority. As a response to this challenge, the International
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) was involved more actively
in the Basel Process with the aim of staying in closer contact with the BCBS
and IAIS. In 1996, a Joint Forum of the three committees was established.
The globalisation of ¯nancial markets also called for closer cooperation be-
tween the elements of the Basel Process responsible for the overall functioning
and stability of the ¯nancial system. This has lead to a strengthening of ties of
the CGFS and the CPSS with the other committees, respectively monitoring
macro and micro aspects of the infrastructure of the international ¯nancial
system. In addition, the BIS and the BCBS jointly established the Financial
Stability Institute (FSI) to promote cooperation amongst supervisors, primar-
ily through sharing experiences in workshops and seminars.
As the convergence of global best practices continued, the need for more
coordination and cooperation also became more apparent at the level of variousIII THE BASEL PROCESS 9
other international standard setting bodies and the institutions entrusted with
monitoring these standards, primarily the IMF and the Word Bank. In 1999,
the establishment of a more comprehensive framework for coordinating these
e®orts was placed under the umbrella of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF),
which is hosts its secretariat at the BIS, but is operationally independent for




















































































































Figure 2: The Pillars of Sound Financial Systems
The FSF is the main international body orchestrating ¯nancial stability
e®orts, bringing together national ¯nancial authorities, international ¯nan-III THE BASEL PROCESS 10
cial institutions, international regulatory and supervisory groupings as well as
committees of central bank experts. It seeks to co-ordinate the e®orts of these
various bodies in order to promote international ¯nancial stability, improve the
functioning of markets, and reduce systemic risk. In an attempt to improve
the architectural blue-print for the global international ¯nancial system, the
FSF designated twelve key standard areas as key for sound ¯nancial systems
and deserving of priority implementation, depending on individual countries'
circumstances.
As is shown in ¯gure 2, these areas can loosely be grouped into three cate-
gories, which in turn form the pillars which form the basis for sound ¯nancial
systems.
² Macroeconomic policy and data transparency forms the ¯rst pillar of
sound ¯nancial systems; de¯ning standards for transparency with regards
to monetary and ¯nancial policy, ¯scal policy and data dissemination, this
is almost exclusively the responsibility of the IMF.10
² The second element focuses on ¯nancial regulation and supervision, in
particular the principles and objectives that fall under the auspices of
the Joint Forum with regards to banking and insurance supervision and
securities regulation.
² The third pillar covers all issues related to institutional and market in-
frastructure, stretching from corporate governance, international account-
ing standards and auditing to payments and settlements. Both the BCBS
(through the aspect of market discipline under Basel II) and, more di-
rectly, the CPSS through its Core Principles form Basel Process-related
10See the IMF's Code of Good Practices on Monetary and Financial Policies, Code of Good
Practices in Fiscal Transparency and the Data Dissemination System (GDDS, SDDS).III THE BASEL PROCESS 11
elements of this last aspect of global ¯nancial stability.
C Current Sources of Concern or Threats to Financial
Stability
Similar to its monetary equivalent, achieving ¯nancial stability is not a one-
o® e®ort but rather a continuous quest by the various bodies involved in the
process. As such, identifying potential threats is a key ingredient for a continu-
ous strengthening of the stability of both national and global ¯nancial systems,
the boundaries of which have become increasingly blurred due to increasing
inter-market linkages. Put di®erently, the separation between national and
global aspects of ¯nancial stability look increasingly arti¯cial, not at least be-
cause of the incessant threat of contagion. At present, there are a number of
issues on the radar screens of di®erent bodies (listed in no particular order of
signi¯cance or preference):
² Resilience of ¯nancial markets and institutions: As historically low global
growth rates lead to sharp corrections in market valuations, the balance
sheets of many ¯nancial institutions came under immense strain (sky-
rocketing default rates, collapsing equity markets and widening credit
spreads). Unlike in previous comparable periods, the ¯nancial systems
seem to have endured the recent slowdown remarkably well. Whist there
is ample evidence that markets currently perceive the system as stable
and improving, there may be impending systemic risks that have built
up in the process. Could there be a threat to future ¯nancial resilience,
if the macro environment does not improve further?
² Excess global liquidity: Accommodative monetary policy in many indus-IV OUTLOOK 12
trial economies has supported a revival of the global economy after several
major adverse shocks. However, the associated strong growth in liquidity
has raised some concern, including accelerated in°ation, ¯nancial imbal-
ances and spillovers from the G3 to other smaller economies.
² Concentration risk: [to be expanded]
² Role of the central bank as LOLR vs. risks emanating from non-bank
institutions [to be expanded]
IV Outlook
The Basel Process plays a key role with regards to this aspect of promoting
¯nancial stability in that the various committees provide a unique platform
or forum for discussing and analysing current sources of concern or threats
to stability. All of which - in isolation or combination with each other, both
short term and longer term - need diligent monitoring and a close consideration
of the appropriate steps in order to ensure further progress in the respective
¯elds.REFERENCES 13
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